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Credible Criminal Enforcement Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics Matthew Baker ()
Thomas Miceli ()
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Article provided by Springer in its journal European Journal of Law and Economics .
Volume (Year): 20 (2005)
Issue (Month): 1 (July)
Pages: 5-15
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Handle: RePEc:kap:ejlwec:v:20:y:2005:i:1:p:5-15Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=100264
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Keywords: economics of crime ; credible policies ; time consistency ; Other versions of this item:
References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile , click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.: A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, 2000.
"The Economic Theory of Public Enforcement of Law ,"
Journal of Economic Literature ,
American Economic Association, vol. 38(1), pages 45-76, March.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions: Winand Emons, 2004.
"Subgame-Perfect Punishment for Repeat Offenders ,"
Economic Inquiry ,
Oxford University Press, vol. 42(3), pages 496-502, July.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
Winand Emons, 2002.
"Subgame Perfect Punishment for Repeat Offenders ,"
Diskussionsschriften
dp0211, Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft.
[Downloadable!] Emons, Winand, 2002.
"Subgame Perfect Punishment for Repeat Offenders ,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
3667, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
[Downloadable!] (restricted) Winand Emons, .
"Subgame Perfect Punishment for Repeat Offenders ,"
German Working Papers in Law and Economics
2003-1-1054, Berkeley Electronic Press.
[Downloadable!] Gary S. Becker, 1968.
"Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach ,"
Journal of Political Economy ,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 76, pages 169.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions: Kydland, Finn E & Prescott, Edward C, 1977.
"Rules Rather Than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans ,"
Journal of Political Economy ,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 85(3), pages 473-91, June.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Robin W. Boadway & Nicolas Marceau & Maurice Marchand, 1993.
"Time-Consistent Criminal Sanctions ,"
Working Papers
883, Queen's University, Department of Economics.
Other versions:
BOADWAYÊ, Robin & MARCEAUÊ, Nicolas & MARCHANDÊ, Maurice, 1994.
"Time-Consistent Criminal Sanctions ,"
CORE Discussion Papers
1994010, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
Boadway, R. & Marceau, N. & Marchand, M., 1993.
"Time-Consistent Criminal Sanctions ,"
Papers
9318, Laval - Recherche en Politique Economique.
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references Cited by : (explanations , Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile , click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)
Roland Kirstein, .
"Bayesian Monitoring ,"
German Working Papers in Law and Economics
2005-1-1132, Berkeley Electronic Press.
[Downloadable!]
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