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Teaching Auction Strategy Using Experiments Administered via the Internet

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Author Info
John Asker (New York University’s Leonard N. Stern School of Business)
Brit Grosskopf (Texas A&M University)
C. Nicholas McKinney () (Rhodes College)
Muriel Niederle (Stanford University)
Alvin E. Roth (Department of Economics at Harvard University and Harvard Business School)
Georg Weizsäcker (London School of Economics)

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Abstract

The authors present an experimental design used to teach concepts in the economics of auctions and implications for e-Business procurement. The experiment is easily administered and can be adapted to many different treatments. The chief innovation is that it does not require the use of a lab or class time. Instead, the design can be implemented on any of the many Web-based auction sites (we use Yahoo!). This design has been used to demonstrate how information is transmitted by bids in an auction and how this can make it difficult for well-informed bidders to profit from their information, leading to disincentives for relatively informed bidders to enter an auction. Consequently, an auction may sometimes be an ineffective mechanism for procurement, compared with other options. The auction experiment shows how information can dramatically affect market outcomes and bidder incentives.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by Helen Dwight Reid Foundation in its journal The Journal of Economic Education.

Volume (Year): 35 (2004)
Issue (Month): 4 ()
Pages: 330-342
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Handle: RePEc:jee:journl:v:35:y:2004:i:4:p:330-342

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Related research
Keywords: auctions; experiments; teaching;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
A2 - General Economics and Teaching - - Economic Education and Teaching of Economics
C9 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments
D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Auctions

Cited by:
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  1. Axel Ockenfels & Alvin E. Roth, 2003. "Late and Multiple Bidding in Second Price Internet Auctions: Theory and Evidence Concerning Different Rules for Ending an Auction," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
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  2. Dan Ariely & Axel Ockenfels & Alvin E. Roth, 2002. "An Experimental Analysis of Ending Rules in Internet Auctions," Papers on Strategic Interaction 2002-47, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
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This page was last updated on 2009-10-29.


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