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Characterizations of the pivotal mechanism

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Author Info
Moulin, H.

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File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6V76-45911CX-4Y/2/3a5f2eceaa6e7596348358fe7ffd63fe
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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Public Economics.

Volume (Year): 31 (1986)
Issue (Month): 1 (October)
Pages: 53-78
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Handle: RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:31:y:1986:i:1:p:53-78

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505578

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  5. Pivato, Marcus, 2006. "Approximate implementation of Relative Utilitarianism via Groves-Clarke pivotal voting with virtual money," MPRA Paper 627, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
  6. Kazuhiko Hashimoto & Hiroki Saitoh, 2008. "Strategy-Proof and Anonymous Rule in Queueing Problems: A Relationship between Equity and Efficiency," Discussion Papers in Economics and Business 08-17, Osaka University, Graduate School of Economics and Osaka School of International Public Policy (OSIPP). [Downloadable!]
  7. Manipushpak Mitra & Suresh Mutuswami, 2006. "Group Strategyproofness in Queueing Models," Economics Discussion Papers 610, University of Essex, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  8. Tatsuyoshi Saijo & Takehiko Yamato & Konomu Yokotani, 2003. "Non-Excludable Public Good Experiments revised October 2003, forthcoming in Games and Economic Behavior," Discussion papers 03011, Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry (RIETI). [Downloadable!]
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  10. Jens Leth Hougaard & Hervé Moulin & Lars Peter Østerdal, 2008. "Decentralized Pricing in Minimum Cost Spanning Trees," Discussion Papers 08-24, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  11. Shinji Ohseto, 2006. "Characterizations of strategy-proof and fair mechanisms for allocating indivisible goods," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 29(1), pages 111-121, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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