1. Chamley, Christophe & Gale, Douglas, 1994. "Information Revelation and Strategic Delay in a Model of Investment," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 62(5), pages 1065-85, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • Gale, D. & Chamley, C., 1992. "Information Revelation and Strategic Delay in a Model of Investment," Papers 10, Boston University - Department of Economics.
2. Milgrom, Paul & Roberts, John, 1990. "Rationalizability, Learning, and Equilibrium in Games with Strategic Complementarities," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 58(6), pages 1255-77, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
3. Bolton, Patrick & Farrell, Joseph, 1990. "Decentralization, Duplication, and Delay," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 98(4), pages 803-26, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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   • Bolton, P. & Ferrel, J., 1988. "Decentralization, Deplication And Delay," Papers e-88-49, Stanford - Hoover Institution.
4. V. V. Chari & Patrick J. Kehoe, 2003. "Financial Crises as Herds: Overturning the Critiques," NBER Working Papers 9658, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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   • V. V. Chari & Patrick J. Kehoe, 2003. "Financial crises as herds: overturning the critiques," Staff Report 316, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. [Downloadable!]
   • Chari, V. V. & Kehoe, Patrick J., 2004. "Financial crises as herds: overturning the critiques," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 119(1), pages 128-150, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
5. Caplin, Andrew & Leahy, John, 1994. "Business as Usual, Market Crashes, and Wisdom after the Fact," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(3), pages 548-65, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • Caplin, A. & Leahy, J., 1992. "Business as Usual, Market Crashes, and Wisdom after the Fact," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1594, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
   • Caplin, A. & Leahy, J., 1992. "Business as Usual, Market Crashes and Wisdom After the Fact," Discussion Papers 1992_18, Columbia University, Department of Economics.
6. Gul, Faruk & Lundholm, Russell, 1995. "Endogenous Timing and the Clustering of Agents' Decisions," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 103(5), pages 1039-66, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
7. Bikhchandani, Sushil & Hirshleifer, David & Welch, Ivo, 1992. "A Theory of Fads, Fashion, Custom, and Cultural Change in Informational Cascades," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 100(5), pages 992-1026, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
8. Morris, Stephen & Shin, Hyun Song, 1998. "Unique Equilibrium in a Model of Self-Fulfilling Currency Attacks," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(3), pages 587-97, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • Morris, S & Song Shin, H, 1996. "Unique Equilibrium in a Model of Self-Fulfilling Currency Attacks," Economics Papers 126, Economics Group, Nuffield College, University of Oxford.
   • Morris, Stephen & Shin, Hyun Song, 1997. "Unique Equilibrium in a Model of Self-fulfilling Currency Attacks," CEPR Discussion Papers 1687, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
9. Chamley, Christophe, 2004. "Delays and equilibria with large and small information in social learning," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 48(3), pages 477-501, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
10. Diamond, Peter A, 1982. "Aggregate Demand Management in Search Equilibrium," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 90(5), pages 881-94, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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    • P. Diamond, 1980. "Aggregate Demand Management in Search Equilibrium," Working papers 268, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
11. Banerjee, Abhijit V, 1992. "A Simple Model of Herd Behavior," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 107(3), pages 797-817, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
12. Sandeep Baliga & Tomas Sj–str–m, 2004. "Arms Races and Negotiations," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 71(2), pages 351-369, 04. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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    • Sandeep Baliga & Tomas Sjostrom, 2001. "Arms Races and Negotiations," NajEcon Working Paper Reviews 391749000000000005, www.najecon.org. [Downloadable!]
    • Sandeep Baliga & Tomas Sjostrom, 2001. "Arms Races and Negotiations," Economics Working Papers 0007, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science. [Downloadable!]
    • Sandeep Baliga & Tomas Sjostrom, 2003. "Arms Races and Negotiations," Levine's Working Paper Archive 618897000000000766, David K. Levine. [Downloadable!]
    • Balinga, Sandeep & Sjostrom, Tomas, 2001. "Arms Races and Negotiations," Working Papers 3-01-2, Pennsylvania State University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
13. Vettas, Nikolaos, 2000. "On entry, exit, and coordination with mixed strategies," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 44(8), pages 1557-1576, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
14. Thomas D. Jeitschko & Curtis R. Taylor, 2001. "Local Discouragement and Global Collapse: A Theory of Coordination Avalanches," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(1), pages 208-224, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
15. Bryant, John, 1987. "The Paradox of Thrift, Liquidity Preference and Animal Spirits," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 55(5), pages 1231-35, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
16. Andreas Park & Lones Smith, 2004. "Caller Number Five: Timing Games that Morph From One Form to Another," 2004 Meeting Papers 871, Society for Economic Dynamics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
    • Andreas Park & Lones Smith, 2006. "Caller Number Five: Timing Games that Morph from One Form to Another," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1554, Cowles Foundation, Yale University. [Downloadable!]
17. Cooper, Russell & John, Andrew, 1988. "Coordinating Coordination Failures in Keynesian Models," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 103(3), pages 441-63, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
18. Fudenberg, Drew & Tirole, Jean, 1985. "Preemption and Rent Equilization in the Adoption of New Technology," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 52(3), pages 383-401, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
19. Bryant, John, 1983. "A Simple Rational Expectations Keynes-Type Model," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 98(3), pages 525-28, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
20. Levin, Dan & Peck, James, 2003. " To Grab for the Market or to Bide One's Time: A Dynamic Model of Entry," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 34(3), pages 536-56, Autumn.
21. Jones, Larry E & Manuelli, Rodolfo E, 1992. "The Coordination Problem and Equilibrium Theories of Recessions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(3), pages 451-71, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    • Larry E. Jones & R. E. Manuelli, 1987. "The Coordination Problem and Equilibrium Theories of Recessions," Discussion Papers 753, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]

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1. Asen Ivanov & Dan Levin & James Peck, 2008. "Study of a Small-Market Investment Game with Common and Private Values," Working Papers 0801, VCU School of Business, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]