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• Andreas Ortmann

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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Economic Theory.

Volume (Year): 132 (2007)
Issue (Month): 1 (January)
Pages: 274-290
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Handle: RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:132:y:2007:i:1:p:274-290

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