The deterrent effects of settlements and trials

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The deterrent effects of settlements and trials

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Polinsky, A. Mitchell
Rubinfeld, Daniel L.

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A. Mitchell Polinsky

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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal International Review of Law and Economics.

Volume (Year): 8 (1988)
Issue (Month): 1 (June)
Pages: 109-116
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Handle: RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:8:y:1988:i:1:p:109-116

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Andrew F. Daughety & Jennifer F. Reinganum, 1994. "Product Safety: Liability, R&D and Signaling," Game Theory and Information 9403007, EconWPA, revised 30 Mar 1994. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Daughety, Andrew & Reinganum, Jennifer, 1992. "Product Safety: Liability, R & D and Signaling," Working Papers 94-17, University of Iowa, Department of Economics, revised 1994.
- Daughety, Andrew F & Reinganum, Jennifer F, 1995. "Product Safety: Liability, R&D, and Signaling," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(5), pages 1187-1206, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Howard F. Chang & Hilary Sigman, 2005. "The Effect of Joint and Several Liability Under Superfund on Brownfields," NBER Working Papers 11667, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Howard F. Chang & Hilary Sigman, 2005. "The Effect of Joint and Several Liability under Superfund on Brownfields," Departmental Working Papers 200508, Rutgers University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
- Chang, Howard F. & Sigman, Hilary, 2007. "The effect of joint and several liability under superfund on brownfields," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 27(4), pages 363-384, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Peter Van Wijck & Jan Winters, 2001. "The Principle of Full Compensation in Tort Law," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 11(3), pages 319-332, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Alfredo Esposto, 1998. "Takings, litigation, and just compensation," Atlantic Economic Journal, International Atlantic Economic Society, vol. 26(4), pages 397-412, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Luigi Alberto Franzoni, 1995. "Prosecutorial Discretion and Criminal Deterrence," Working Papers 234, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna. [Downloadable!]
Yeon-Koo Che & Kathryn E. Spier, 2007. "Exploiting Plaintiffs Through Settlement: Divide and Conquer," Discussion Papers 0607-18, Columbia University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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- Che, Yeon-Koo & Spier, Kathryn, 2007. "Exploiting Plaintiffs Through Settlement: Divide and Conquer," MPRA Paper 6104, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
- Yeon-Koo Che & Kathryn E. Spier, 2008. "Exploiting Plaintiffs through Settlement: Divide and Conquer," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 164(1), pages 4-23, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Benoit, J.P. & Kornhauser, L.A., 1996. "Game Theoretic Analysis of Legal Rules and Institutions," Working Papers 96-30, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University. [Downloadable!]
Andrew F. Daughety & Jennifer F. Reinganum, 1994. "Keeping Society in the Dark: On the Admissibility of Pretrial Negotiations As Evidence in Court," Game Theory and Information 9403008, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Daughety, A. & Reinganum, J., 1991. "Keeping Society in the Dark : On the Admissibility of Pretrial Nogotiations as Evidence in Court," Working Papers 91-24, University of Iowa, Department of Economics.
- Daughety, Andrew & Reinganum, Jennifer, 1994. "Keeping Society in the Dark: On the Admissibility of Pretrial Negotiations as Evidence in Court," Working Papers 94-06, University of Iowa, Department of Economics.
- Andrew F. Daughety & Jennifer F. Reinganum, 1995. "Keeping Society in the Dark: On the Admissibility of Pretrial Negotiations as Evidence in Court," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 26(2), pages 203-221, Summer. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Abraham Wickelgren, 2004. "A Model of Welfare-Reducing Settlement," Contributions to Economic Analysis & Policy, Berkeley Electronic Press, vol. 3(1), pages 1202-1202. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Peter Van Wijck & Ben Van Velthoven, 2000. "An Economic Analysis of the American and the Continental Rule for Allocating Legal Costs," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 9(2), pages 115-125, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

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