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Would Economic Democracy Decrease the Amount of Public Bads?

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Author Info
Roemer, John E

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Abstract

The general argument of those who believe that economic democracy decreases the amount of public bads is that, with economic democracy, 'the people' would make decisions rather than a small class of capitalists. An attempt is made to evaluate and analyze this argument. Several possibilities emerge and the situation is found to be more subtle than implied by this popular argument. Copyright 1993 by The editors of the Scandinavian Journal of Economics.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by Blackwell Publishing in its journal Scandinavian Journal of Economics.

Volume (Year): 95 (1993)
Issue (Month): 2 ()
Pages: 227-38
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Handle: RePEc:bla:scandj:v:95:y:1993:i:2:p:227-38

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  1. Frank Milne & David Kelsey, 2006. "Takeovers and Cooperatives," Working Papers 1113, Queen's University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  2. Renström, Thomas I & Yalcin, Erkan, 2002. "Endogenous Firm Objectives," CEPR Discussion Papers 3361, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  3. Frank Milne & David Kelsey, 2005. "Externalities, Monopoly and the Objective Function of the Firm," Working Papers 1078, Queen's University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. Christopher J. Ellis & Anne van den Nouweland, 2000. "A Mechanism for Inducing Cooperation in Non-Cooperative Environments: Theory and Applications," University of Oregon Economics Department Working Papers 2000-2, University of Oregon Economics Department, revised 01 Feb 2000. [Downloadable!]
  5. Giacomo Corneo, 2005. "Media Capture in a Democracy: The Role of Wealth Concentration," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
  6. James A. Yunker, 2003. "Capital Wealth Inequality and Public Bads: A Mathematical Analysis," Eastern Economic Journal, Eastern Economic Association, vol. 29(1), pages 105-119, Winter. [Downloadable!]
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This page was last updated on 2009-10-26.

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