This paper analyzes competition among financial intermediaries in a set-up where financial intermediaries economize on duplicated monitoring (D. W. Diamond, 1984). The author analyzes two different games in which both direct trade and indirect trade are available. She shows that in general equilibrium outcomes are inefficient, so that Diamond's efficiency result is fragile. Intermediation may increase rather than decrease transaction costs. Disintermediation may also be an equilibrium. The author discusses the role played by the nonconvexities of banks' technology and that played by competition for deposits and loans. Copyright 1997 by The Review of Economic Studies Limited.
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Volume (Year): 64 (1997) Issue (Month): 2 (April) Pages: 215-39 Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML
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