This paper examines natural restrictions mechanisms. If all mechanisms are considered and preferences satisfy a basic condition, then any social choice correspondence can be implemented in undominated strategies. This result derives from the use of mechanisms with questionable features. In part of the message space the agent who announces the highest integer is rewarded. If such mechanisms are ruled out, then the social choice correspondences which can be implemented.in undominated strategies satisfy an incentive compatibility type condition. For social choice functions this is equivalent to strategy-proofness. This issue should be examined for other solution concepts. The last portion of the paper begins to explore the issue as it relates to Nash implementation and undominated Nash implementation. Copyright 1992 by The Review of Economic Studies Limited.
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Volume (Year): 59 (1992) Issue (Month): 4 (October) Pages: 757-75 Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML
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