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Decentralized Trading, Strategic Behaviour and the Walrasian Outcome

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Author Info
Rubinstein, Ariel
Wolinsky, Asher

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Abstract

For a market with a finite number of agents, pairwise matching, and bargaining, it is shown that, even when the market is frictionless, the equilibrium is not necessarily competitive. It depends on the amount of information agents use. If their behavior is conditioned only on the sets of agents present and the time, the competitive solution is the unique subgame perfect equilibrium. If agents have full information and condition their behavior on some of it, there are also noncompetitive equilibria in which behavior depends on specific information such as the identity of the trading partner and past events. Copyright 1990 by The Review of Economic Studies Limited.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by Blackwell Publishing in its journal Review of Economic Studies.

Volume (Year): 57 (1990)
Issue (Month): 1 (January)
Pages: 63-78
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Handle: RePEc:bla:restud:v:57:y:1990:i:1:p:63-78

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  1. Camera, Gabriele & Selcuk, Cemil, 2006. "Bilateral Matching and Latin Squares," Purdue University Economics Working Papers 1190, Purdue University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  2. Art Shneyerov, 2006. "Dynamic Matching with Two-sided Incomplete Information and Participation Costs," Theory workshop papers 815595000000000009, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  3. Tesfatsion, Leigh, 2000. "Structure, Behavior, and Market Power in an Evolutionary Labor Market with Adaptive Search," Staff General Research Papers 1681, Iowa State University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  4. Gabriele Camera & Alain Delacroix, 2004. "Trade Mechanism Selection in Markets with Frictions," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 7(4), pages 851-868, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  5. Tanguy, ISAAC, 2006. "Information revelation in markets with pairwise meetings : dynamic case with constant entry flow," Discussion Papers (ECON - Département des Sciences Economiques) 2006026, Université catholique de Louvain, Département des Sciences Economiques. [Downloadable!]
  6. Ruilin Zhou, 1999. "Does commodity money eliminate the indeterminacy of equilibria?," Working Paper Series WP-99-15, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago. [Downloadable!]
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  7. Andrew F. Daughety & Jennifer F. Reinganum, 1994. "Settlement Negotiations with Two-Sided Asymmetric Information: Model Duality, Information Distribution and Efficiency," Game Theory and Information 9403009, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
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  8. Leigh Tesfatsion, 1998. "Ex Ante Capacity Effects in Evolutionary Labor Markets with Adaptive Search," Labor and Demography 9811003, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
  9. Michael Peters & Sergei Severinov, 2001. "Internet Auctions with Many Traders," Working Papers peters-01-01, University of Toronto, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  10. Brown, Martin & Falk, Armin & Fehr, Ernst, 2002. "Contractual Incompleteness and the Nature of Market Interactions," CEPR Discussion Papers 3272, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  11. Satterthwaite, Mark & Shneyerov, Art, 2004. "Dynamic Matching,Two-sided Incomplete Information, and Participation Costs: Existence and Convergence to Perfect Competition," Micro Theory Working Papers shneyerov-04-12-17-02-54-, Microeconomics.ca Website, revised 17 Dec 2004. [Downloadable!]
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  12. Penta, Antonio, 2007. "Collective Bargaining and Walrasian Equilibrium," MPRA Paper 10260, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised Sep 2007. [Downloadable!]
  13. Andersson, Ola, 2006. "Bargaining in Collusive Markets," Working Papers 2006:21, Lund University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  14. Edward J. Green & Ruilin Zhou, 2000. "Dynamic monetary equilibrium in a random-matching economy," Working Paper Series WP-00-1, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago. [Downloadable!]
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  15. Hamid Sabourian, 2000. "Bargaining and Markets: Complexity and the Walrasian Outcome," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1249, Cowles Foundation, Yale University. [Downloadable!]
  16. repec:att:wimass:1920111 is not listed on IDEAS
  17. Artyom Shneyerov & Adam Chi Leung Won, 2008. "The Rate of Convergence to Perfect Competition of Matching and Bargaining Mechanisms," Discussion Papers 1467, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
  18. Douglas Gale & Hamid Sabourian, 2003. "Complexity and Competition, Part I: Sequential Matching," Levine's Bibliography 666156000000000199, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  19. Satterthwaite, Mark & Shneyerov, Artyom, 2003. "Convergence of a Dynamic Matching and Bargaining Market with Two-sided Incomplete Information to Perfect Competition," Micro Theory Working Papers shneyerov-03-12-17-09-36-, Microeconomics.ca Website, revised 17 Dec 2003. [Downloadable!]
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  20. Steve Anderson & Daniel Friedman & Garrett Milam & Nirvikar Singh, 2004. "Buy it Now: A Hybrid Internet Market Institution," Santa Cruz Department of Economics, Working Paper Series 1023, Department of Economics, UC Santa Cruz. [Downloadable!]
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  21. Kazuya Kamiya & Takashi Shimizu, 2006. "A Dynamic General Equilibrium Model with Centralized Auction Markets," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-417, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo. [Downloadable!]
  22. Clara Ponsat?Author-Email: Clara.ponsati@uab.es, 2001. "Search and bargaining in large markets with homogeneous traders," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 533.02, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC). [Downloadable!]
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