A simple duopoly model is used to show the advantage to a manufacturer of se lling his product through an independent retailer (vertical separatio n) rather than directly to consumers (vertical integration). Vertical separation is profitable insofar as it induces more friendly behavio r from the rival manufacturer. The authors consider the case where fr anchise fees can be used to extract retailers' surplus. They show tha t vertical separation is in the collective, as well as individual, in terest of manufacturers, and hence facilitates some collusion in the simple setting that they examine. Copyright 1988 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
Download Info
To download:
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the
proper application to
view it first. Information about this may be contained
in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read
the IDEAS help
page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS
site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Volume (Year): 36 (1988) Issue (Month): 3 (March) Pages: 257-65 Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML
(with abstract),
plain text
(with abstract),
BibTeX,
RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite),
ReDIF
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Christopher F. Baum).
Related research
Keywords:
Other versions of this item:
Cited by: (explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.) This item has more than 25 citations. To prevent cluttering this page, these citations are listed on a separate page.