This paper investigates the effect of positive marginal monitoring and enforcement costs, 'policing cost,' on the optimal exploitation of a fishery under the management of a marine protected area. It is shown that with positive marginal policing cost, the objective of maximum economic yield is no longer optimal, and that some dissipation of economic rent is socially optimal. The relevance of environmental education, the efficacy of policing, and the weightiness of punishments to optimal rent dissipation is discussed. Relevance of the model to other fisheries institutions is claimed.
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