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Economic Incentives and the Defense Procurement Process

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Author Info
Rogerson, William P
Abstract

This paper describes some of the insights that the economic theory of incentives can contribute to defense procurement policy analysis. It describes the underlying incentive problems that shape the defense procurement problem, the nature of current institutions and how they affect actors' behavior, and possible directions for improving the procurement process suggested by viewing it as a solution to a complex set of incentive problems. Incentive problems between government and defense firms and incentive problems within government are both considered. Copyright 1994 by American Economic Association.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by American Economic Association in its journal Journal of Economic Perspectives.

Volume (Year): 8 (1994)
Issue (Month): 4 (Fall)
Pages: 65-90
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Handle: RePEc:aea:jecper:v:8:y:1994:i:4:p:65-90

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  7. Rajeev K. Goel, 1999. "On contracting for uncertain R&D," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 20(2), pages 99-106.
  8. Andreas Blume & Asher Tishler, 2000. "Security Needs and the Performance of the Defense Industry," CIG Working Papers FS IV 00-04, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (WZB), Research Unit: Competition and Innovation (CIG). [Downloadable!]
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  11. Wallace HUFFMAN & Richard E. JUST, 1995. "Transaction Costs, Fads, And Politically Motivated Misdirection In Agricultural Research," Staff Papers 277, Iowa State University Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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